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In traumatic financial times, both shareholders and the media promptly blame 
companies for lack of decent corporate governance mechanisms. Proxy statement 
proposals have increasingly been used by the more active shareholders as to vindicate 
managers to correct anomalies and restore financial markets’ confidence. I examine the 
proposals of the largest companies in the S&P 500 index after the Lehmann Brothers 
crash and their effect on stock prices. Proposals initiated by shareholders negatively 
impact the company’s stock price, particularly if the proposers are unions, pension 
funds and institutional investors. Also, I find corporate governance proposals to harm 
firm’s market performance, unlike compensation and social policy proposals whose 
effects are intangible. The exception to these disappointing attempts to improve 





President Barack Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA) on February 17, 2009. The economic stimulus package was a response to the 
recession triggered by the Lehmann Brothers bankruptcy a few months earlier, and 
contemplated corporate governance legislation, essentially say on pay resolutions. After 
this event did companies revise their directives in this sense? Proxy statements may 
mention the implementation of several reforms and it is important to identify not only 
what concerns investors have but also who submits proposals. In uneasy times, 
shareholders historically tend to cease the public mediatization on corporate governance 
flaws to propose incisive altercations via proxy statement (Byrne and Hawkins, 1993). 
Academic researchers recurrently refer the dissemblance in profitability between 
shareholders and managers of corporations during depressed economic periods. The 
approval of ARRA imposed say on pay legislation, setting up a corporate framework 
with guidelines attempting to reduce the agency problem. The governmental efforts to 
empower the corporate governance system, and ultimately the improvement seeking on 
the overall corporate sphere should be taken to great consideration. It is important to 
evaluate how both parties respond to the executive compensation enticed policy and if 
financial markets grasp their initiatives. Bottom-line, is a brutal financial crash enough 
of a wakeup call to those partaking in the corporate governance role? 
This paper investigates how financial markets respond to proxy statement proposals 
considering two key aspects: who initiates them and what they are about. I primarily 
focus on reactions around the proxy statement submission date and then, for robustness 
purposes, also analyze the annual meeting date where the proposals outcome is learnt. 
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Furthermore, I investigate the effect of an approval recommendation by the Board of 
Directors for a proposal and analyze the interaction effect between active shareholders 
and type of proposal. The basic review addresses 1) the distinction between proposals 
submitted by the Board of Directors (BoD) and by shareholders, 2) shareholder 
proposals split into institutional, individuals and social groups and 3) proposals by their 
nature – compensation, corporate governance and social policy. 
Jensen and Murphy (1989) show the little correlation between CEO compensation and 
the profitability of their firms pointing out the agency problem and how shareholders 
get systematically undermined, above all during meager financial times. In response, 
shareholders follow CalPERS blossom of activism (Crutchley et al., 1998), particularly 
institutional investors as their power translates into the best position to supervise 
managers (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; Schleifer and Vishny, 1986). The submission 
of proposals in the proxy statement is upheld by Bebchuk (2005) as a wholesome 
instrument for shareholders to impel their interests and the latest research point to an 
increase in the number of submitted proposals in the 2000s (Cotter and Thomas, 2007; 
Cremers and Romano, 2007). A dispute between shareholders and managers often rises 
from the submission of proposals by shareholders, seldom successful as their approval 
is fought using resources reducing firm value (Forjan, 1999) but also discouraging 
shareholders as a target company reveals lacklustre performance (Karpoff et al., 1996) 
and weak corporate governance framework (Gillan and Starks, 2007). From these prior 
findings emerges my first research question: Do financial markets distinguish proposals 
from the companies’ Boards of Directors and those from shareholders? 
In fact, most studies report insignificant reaction (Karpoff et al., 1996; Romano, 2001; 
Cotter and Thomas, 2007) or a negative stock return (Forjan, 1999; Prevost and Rao, 
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2000) around the proxy statement and annual meeting dates, the exception being when a 
particular shareholder is studied: CalPERS notably influences positively its target 
companies (Nesbitt, 1994; Del Guercio and Hakwins, 1999 and English et al., 2004). 
Thus, my second research question is as follows: Is there a group of especially active 
and effective shareholders? 
The media has mostly directed its interest towards the controversial subject of executive 
compensation and Murphy (1999) actually detects the boost in volume of research on 
this matter to exceed the steep growth in executive pay during the 1990s. Changes in 
compensation usually have a positive market reply (Brickley et al., 1985; Kumar and 
Sopariwala, 1992; Tehranian and Waegelein, 1985) foreseeing routine proposals on this 
topic, considering the 2008 dismal financial events. Therefore, in the final part of my 
study I investigate the proposal nature: Do compensation proposals overshadow the 
remainder and have a special effect on the firms’ stock performance? 
My sample is composed by 140 firms of the largest S&P500 firms in 2009. While 88 of 
these report proposals by the BoD, 110 companies are targeted by shareholders, leaving 
58 with both types of proposals. Shareholders are categorized into three broad groups: 
(i) unions, pension funds, institutional investors and institutional investor associations, 
(ii) individual investors and (iii) social, environmental and religious funds and related 
service providers, as well as two additional categories for proposals of indefinite 
proposer (unknown) and those by more than one shareholder (mixed). I also organize 
proposals by their nature: (i) executive compensation, (ii) corporate governance and (iii) 
social policy, where shareholder proposals achieve approval rates (majority vote at the 
annual meeting) of 18%, 28% and 0%, respectively. Also, Boards of Directors 
overwhelmingly focus on executive compensation while shareholders have a more 
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evened proposal distribution between the former, corporate governance and social 
policy. On the sector analysis, Health Care companies mainly receive compensation 
proposals with 48%, opposite to Energy, Financials and Utilities with barely 20%. 
For each of the three questions, where the CAR around the proxy statement and annual 
meeting dates is the dependent variable, there are two equations: the first contains 
dummy variables as key regressors whereas the second employs the actual number of 
proposals. In addition to the major variables, some controls for size, financial results 
and industry are integrated in all analyses. Moreover, some regressions using crossed 
variables scrutinize the proposal nature for each shareholder group. 
Results show the number of proposals by shareholders negatively impacts the company 
stock return, concurrent with Forjan’s (1999) argument of firm value reduction due to 
the resource expense the management resorts to while attempting to hamper its voting 
success at the annual meeting. If previous studies point to a positive market reaction to 
some institutional investors’ isolated activism, the same cannot be said about a more 
general approach as proposals by institutional investors induce a loss in the companies’ 
stock prices. Companies with mixed proposals, shared by more than one shareholder, 
stand out as financial markets effectively praise joint initiatives. Finally, both literature 
and common knowledge’s anticipation of executive compensation as the most 
influential topic, is ruined when the respective variables turn out to be insignificant. On 
the contrary, firms with corporate governance proposals notice a value decrease. When 
the proposal originator and nature are over crossed, additional information surfaces: 
corporate governance proposals from institutional, individual and mixed shareholders 
account for a negative reaction while compensation proposals submitted by individual 
shareholders are perceived positively by financial markets. 
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This paper reassures some inferences suggested by the academic research, while 
exposing others. Shareholder proposals in general, and on corporate governance issues 
in particular have financial markets penalizing companies. If proposals by social, 
environmental and religious groups are expected to have a negative impact due to the 
affluence of such nature, institutional investors do not foresee such reaction, credit to 
CalPERS historically praised achievements on companies. Yet, the latter shareholders 
cause a decrease in stock return on their target companies while the former do not 
provoke any reaction. Widely controversial topic executive compensation and corporate 
unloved social policy end up being astoundingly overshadowed in significance by 
corporate governance as it severely harms companies’ stock prices. On the other hand, 
an upbeat discovery emerges as companies with proposals shared by several 
shareholders are rewarded by investors. When intersecting shareholders and type of 
proposal one can deduce the nature of a proposal eclipses its initiator as governance 
proposals, even by numerous shareholders, reduce firm value. Also, compensation 
proposals from individual investors improve a company’s stock performance. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description 
from the broadness of corporate governance to the specificity of executive 
compensation within the proxy statement domain, where the research questions suitably 
arise. Section 3 portrays the data collection process and explains how the information is 
organized and analyzed. Section 4 denotes the regressions and determines the means 
used to perform them, describing all variables included. Section 5 examines the 
regression outputs and discusses the results in light of the available literature on the 
topic. Section 6 gives my perspective on the new understanding of the problem and 




Whenever a financial crisis occurs, one of the frequently appointed causes is the lack of 
corporate governance mechanisms or their ineffectiveness; an idea supported by Mitton 
(2002) who stresses corporate governance’s prominence during times of financial 
distress. In fact, Boone et al. (2000) state that, in these periods, shareholders’ interests 
are more severely disregarded. The theoretical foundation of corporate governance is 
the agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) created this notion, and it was later 
developed by Fama and Jensen (1983) and Eisenhardt (1989). The conflict between the 
shareholders of a firm and the respective managers is a typical example of the principal-
agent problem – core of the agency theory – which occurs, for instance, when a study 
shows there is very little correlation between performance pay of CEOs and the success 
of the firms they manage (Jensen and Murphy, 1989).  
When corporate governance does fail, shareholders may feel prone to use their influence 
in order to correct the anomaly. In the beginning of the 1990s, when several CEOs were 
dismissed by their boards, CalPERS led a shareholders intervention, in an attempt to 
ensure shareholders’ wealth would not be affected (Crutchley et al., 1998). This 
remarkable event triggered a wave of shareholder activism, especially from the growing 
powerful institutional investors. Besides being in the best position to monitor the 
managers (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; Schleifer and Vishny, 1986), these investors 
began to actively work on behalf of the shareholders’ interest. Black (1990) and Bethel 
and Gillan (2002) point out the legal rules and conflicts of interest that dampen 
shareholder activism, and Black (1998) later argues the shareholders’ lack of effort and 
few capital invested on activism is consistent with the modest effects on firm 
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performance. Nevertheless, Bebchuk (2005) advocates the submission of proposals on 
the company’s proxy statements as a valuable tool to exercise pressure on the managers.  
The proposal submission on the proxy statement is, per se, elementary and inexpensive 
but gathering enough support to approve it at the annual meeting is much more complex 
and if the proposal is in conflict with the management, valuable time and resources are 
spent to counter it, reducing firm value (Forjan, 1999). Furthermore, investors primarily 
focus on poorly performing companies (Karpoff et al, 1996), or on corporations with a 
fragile governance structure (Gillan and Starks, 2007), and despite being less powerful, 
most proposals are submitted by small investors (Forjan, 1999). Substantial amounts of 
academic studies on shareholder activism through the proxy process have been 
published however there is no consensus on its effect on firm value. Regardless of this 
problem, recent studies (Cotter and Thomas, 2007; Cremers and Romano, 2007) report 
a rise in the number of submitted proposals in the 2000s. 
Gordon and Pound (1993), Karpoff et al (1996) and Campbell et al (1999) find the 
overwhelming majority of shareholder-sponsored proposals fail to get approval. Yet, 
Gillan and Starks (2000) later discover an increase in shareholder support. The 
discouraging approval rates may be related to dialogs between shareholders and the 
management resulting in agreement, therefore avoiding the proposal submission via 
proxy statement (Chi and Posner, 2010), or a compromise after the submission of such a 
proposal, leading to its withdrawal (Chidambaran and Woidtke, 1999). Alternatively, 
bolder explanations such as the institutional investors’ business relations with the 
company (Pound, 1988; Brickley et al. 1988) or their political and social interests 
(Woidtke, 2002; Prevost et al., 2009) are suggested that may contribute to a focus 
deviation from monitoring executives and maximizing firm value. 
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On the other hand, Gordon and Pound (1993) find that proposals originated by 
managers easily attract shareholder support. This is also partially explained by the 
relations between the firm and institutional investors but also a vote of confidence on 
the management’s credibility (Raghunandan, 2003).  
The key question now is whether financial markets react to these proposals. However, 
the fact that multiple proposals are submitted (possibly with different outcomes), and 
the information leakage factor are, according to Gillan and Starks (2000), the main 
reason why it is difficult to assess stock price reactions. Necessarily, one should ask: 
I. Do financial markets distinguish proposals from the companies’ Boards of 
Directors and those from shareholders?  
Published research shows little evidence that shareholder proposals are considered an 
effective control device by financial markets. In fact, most studies report either 
insignificant abnormal stock returns around the proxy statement submission and annual 
meeting dates (Karpoff et al., 1996; Romano, 2001; Cotter and Thomas, 2007), or even 
a negative market reaction around these dates (Forjan, 1999; Prevost and Rao, 2000). 
This latter effect may for instance be due to the presence of social or environmental–
related proposals that, if approved, will likely impact the firm’s wealth negatively due to 
its divergence with the corporate profit-obsession. The exceptions to these gloomy 
results seem to be found in studies which analyze a specific shareholder, along with its 
activism effect on the enterprise value. CalPERS is the most popular case, and 
researchers found a consistent influence when improving the performance of firms that 
are targeted by this institution (Nesbitt, 1994; Del Guercio and Hakwins, 1999 and 
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English et al., 2004), but other investors are also considered influential (Holderness and 
Sheehan, 1985). From these findings, the next question emerges: 
II. Is there a group of especially active and effective shareholders? 
Within the multiple proposals submitted by active shareholders, executive 
compensation is one rampant affair. Although it is usually a popular topic of discussion 
it deserves special attention in times of financial crises, as many executives are 
generously rewarded while their companies struggle. The controversy on whether 
performance plans improve the firm’s stock performance has been fuelled, and often 
created, by public interest on executive pay levels (Byrne and Hawkins, 1993).  
As Reingold (1997) comments: “The staggering rise in pay for the good, the bad, and 
the indifferent has left even some advocates of pay for performance wondering whether 
the balance between the CEO and the shareholder is tilting the wrong way.” The 
question comes down to whether current remuneration practices minimize the agency 
costs or actually enhance them. Henderson (2006) dwells on the subject and twigged 
that massive amounts of research papers provided theoretical and empirical evidence 
supporting both sides of the discussion, although a consensus was yet to be met. 
Murphy (1999) finds the accentuated growth in executive pay during the 1990s had 
actually been surpassed by the increase in volume of academic articles on that topic.  
Abowd and Kaplan (1999) state the mandatory disclosure nature of the US CEO 
compensation contracts distinguishes from their peers abroad and stimulates the 
empirical studies on incentive compensation programs. Fernandes et al. (2010) observe 
that although American executives are much better rewarded than their colleagues in 
other countries, the compensation has a more variable component or is more 
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performance-based. Blinder (2009) notices a consequence of an increased variability is 
it encourages the managers to incur on more risk than the shareholders would like to.  
Larcker (1983) is the first study on the association of executives’ compensation and the 
respective company’s stock performance. Results indicate a positive market return after 
a long-term executive compensation plan was adopted, results that were later upheld by 
Brickley et al. (1985) and Kumar and Sopariwala (1992) and even by Tehranian and 
Waegelein (1985) who opted for a short-term performance plan market analysis. 
Battistel et al. (1992) however, do not find a significant increase on shareholder wealth 
as a consequence of adopting performance plans, after Healy (1985) had argued the 
counter productiveness of basing compensation on accounting measures as it would 
only motivate managers to increase their own wealth and not the firm’s. Considering the 
spotlight on this topic, I inquire: 
III. Do compensation proposals overshadow the remainder and have a special 
effect on the firms’ stock performance? 
Sample 
My sample is based on “Executive Compensation, Trends for 2009”, a study by James 
F. Reda & Associates. This company offers independent compensation consulting 
services and this research provides a distinct insight on proxy statement proposals after 
the financial crisis. Accordingly, the 200 largest companies (by market capitalization) of 
the S&P 500 Index were analyzed, where 191 of these filed proxy statements 
prominently between February 1, 2009 and July 28, 2009. Using this list, I review the 
proxy statements of each firm to identify proposals, either originated by the BoD or 
shareholders. I then drop the firms from the sample when I analyze the proxy statement 
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and cannot find any proposal (excluding the auditor approval routine by the BoD). This 
leads to a final sample of 140 firms. Financial data is retrieved from Compustat, market 
data obtained from CRSP and analysts’ consensus forecasts collected from Bloomberg. 
In order to assess whether our sample provides a good representation of the S&P 500 
index, I compare the index sector weightings in December 31, 2008 with the sample 
sector weights by market capitalization, according to GICS. Bhojraj et al. (2003) select 
this classification system offered more homogeneity and lower variances in returns 
when compared to SIC and NAICS, while Boni and Womack (2004) state it is the 
system stock analysts feel describes best the areas of expertise. As shown in Figure 1, 
this sample is a fair proxy of the index which confers credibility to a possible 
extrapolation. 
Next, my focus is to differentiate proposals submitted by the BoD of the company and 
those submitted by shareholders. Out of the 140 companies in the sample, 88 of them 
report management-sponsored proposals while 110 report shareholder proposals. Table 
1 presents an industry analysis of the two subsets of firms. Overall, there are more 
companies where the proposals are initiated by shareholders than by the Board of 
Directors. The opposite, however, happens in the Consumer Discretionary, Financial 
and IT sectors, whose Boards are substantially more active than the average. The 
Telecoms sector has the highest level of activism, given that all companies get 
proposals from both the BoD and shareholders; there are only 4 Telecom firms which is 
not sufficient for a well-founded inference. Another slim sector, Materials, comprises all 
6 firms targeted by shareholders. I also find that Industrial companies’ Boards are the 
least active (less than half submit proposals), and 30% of the Health Care companies are 
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not aimed by shareholders. Finally, Table 1 shows that 58 firms have both types of 
proposals. 
In the subsample which includes 110 companies (shareholders proposals), I identify 306 
proposals, formulated by 385 shareholders. These shareholders are sorted into 3 groups, 
according to the Securities and Exchange Commission: (i) unions, pension funds, 
institutional investors and institutional investor associations, (ii) individual investors 
and (iii) social, environmental and religious funds and related service providers
1
. Some 
companies, tough, have restrictive guidelines regarding the disclosure of the proposer’s 
information. Thus, in some situations it is impossible to identify the shareholders who 
submit a proposal suitably classified as unknown. Other proposals are initiated by more 
than one shareholder – these are filed as mixed.  
Several shareholders are recurrently active, across various companies, initiating 
numerous proposals. The NYC retirement and pension funds, for instance, are 
responsible for 24 proposals, while AFSCME and the AFL-CIO account for 11 and 20, 
respectively, as the most active institutional investors
2
. Certain individual investors as 
William Steiner, Evelyn Davis, John Chevedden or the Rossi family are legendary 
active shareholders, as this sample attests, contributing with more than 10 proposals 
each. Social groups have a more disperse concentration, although the Nathan Cummings 
Foundation or the Congregation of Sisters of St. Agnes are some examples of the more 
active shareholders. Overall, Table 2 shows there is a pretty leveled shareholder 
distribution, and that 15% cannot be identified.   




 American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, American Federation of State 
County and Municipal Employees. 
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Next, I analyze the proposals both quantitatively and qualitatively. In the subsample of 
93 firms with management-sponsored proposals, only 3 of them have Boards submitting 
2 proposals, totaling 96 proposals while the other subsample includes 306 proposals. 
Finally, I categorize the proposals into three distinct groups: (i) executive compensation, 
(ii) corporate governance and (iii) social policy. This categorization is based on the 
Manhattan Institute’s Center for Legal Policy
3
. The sample’s most common 
compensation proposals are essentially say on pay, death benefits or stock options-
related. Corporate governance’s most frequent topic include election of directors, 
cumulative voting, special meeting and independent chairman, while on social policy 
the main matters relate to human rights, health care, political contributions or 
environmental issues. Table 3 shows the proposals distribution into these three 
categories, as well as their lifecycle (Board’s recommendation to approve or reject them 
at the Annual Meeting and voting outcome at the same event). 
The distribution of proposals shows the Board and shareholders contribute similarly 
with 95 and 90 compensation proposals each, respectively, but while this accounts for 
almost the total of Board proposals – only 1 regards corporate governance – its 
representation on the overall shareholder proposals is the lowest with 29%, opposed to 
38% of corporate governance and 33% in social policy (Table 3). Furthermore, a woeful 
1% of compensation and corporate governance proposals from shareholders garner the 
Board’s support, only marginally better than social policy with none. Meanwhile the 
Board obviously recommends shareholders to approve their own proposals, and this 
mechanism appears to produce a strong effect as the outcome is systematic: all Board 





proposals were endorsed by the majority of stockholders. Nonetheless, the 
recommendation is not necessary to validation as compensation and corporate 
governance proposals get respectable approval rates of 18% and 28%; social policy, 
though, get an alarming minimal approval rate as no green lights emerge (Table 3).  
Figure 2 presents the descriptives on the proposals, using the two dimensions analyzed: 
class of proposal and type of entity which originated it. Although both individuals and 
social groups favor one evident subject (weighting over 60%) for corporate governance 
and social policy, respectively, institutional investors cover all concerns with a more 
balanced approach. Proposals of indefinite origin tend to be corporate governance 
related while mixed proposals clearly loom over social policy issues. 
Figure 3 depicts the weight of each type of shareholder for each sort of proposal. Again, 
this outline corroborates the impact of individual investors on corporate governance 
proposals along with the mixed and social groups’ interest in social policy matters. 
Finally, I also investigate the proposal distribution across the different industries. Figure 
4 shows the most targeted sectors in terms of compensation proposals by shareholders, 
revealing Health Care and Telecom companies have more than one compensation 
proposal per active company. Health Care is also the sector where these proposals have 
the largest weight with nearly 50%, whereas Energy, Financials and Utilities receive 
just about 20%. In what concerns corporate governance, while Telecoms rise yet again 
with twice as much proposals per active company as the average of all industries, and 
Utilities firms boast the heaviest interest in this matter with 60%, the IT sector opposes 
with less than 0.5 proposals (Figure 5). As to social policy, Energy and IT firms visibly 
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soar above the rest with over 1 proposal per active company on Figure 6, with the latter 
sector also outranking the remaining in terms of social policy proposals ratio. 
Methodology  
Based on the research questions, I estimate three equations using multiple linear 
regressions. Each, however, can be divided in two: the first includes an indicator 
variable to account for whether there are proposals in that category or not, while the 
second includes the actual number of proposals submitted within that category. In order 
to study my first research question, I estimate the following equations:  
0 1 2 3_ _ i i
i
CAR dv BoD dv Sh recom control          
   (1) 
 
0 1 2 3_ _ i i
i
CAR n BoD n Sh recom control          
    (2) 
These equations analyze how investors perceive the attempts to change the company via 
proxy statement proposals, either by the Board of Directors or shareholders. Ultimately, 
if there is a considerable abnormal return associated with any of the intervenients, that 
effect will be detected in the significance of the variable.  
First there is the dependent variable CAR , cumulative abnormal return. Recall there will 
be two relevant dates, the proxy statement publication date and the annual meeting date 
which originates two variables accordingly. These returns are calculated for the short 
window [-1, 1], centered on the respective dates. The adjustment for market returns is 
done using CRSP’s Value Weighted market index, including dividends. Also, variable 
recom is coded 1 when the company’s Board of Directors recommends approval for any 
of the proposals (disregarding its origin), and 0 otherwise. The indicator variables 
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_dv BoD ( _dv Sh ) represent indicator variables coded 1 when the company receives 
proposals by its BoD (shareholders) and 0 otherwise; while _n BoD ( _n Sh ) embodies 
the number of proposals submitted by company’s BoD (shareholders).  
Schwert (1983) points out the size effect on stock returns which for a regression can be 
controlled with the addition of a firm size variable. In terms of financial results, Hayn 
(1995) states the impact of a loss report on share valuation while Skinner and Sloan 
(2002) stress how stock prices sometimes overreact to earnings surprises, both 
controllable with the appropriate variables later specified. So size features the total 
assets of the firm, _dv NI  yields 1 if the company’s net income is positive and 0 
otherwise; and epss  stands for the difference between the actual EPS and the expected 
EPS according to the Bloomberg analysts’ consensus (all figures report to the quarter 
previous to the events’ dates). Finally, energy , materials , industrials , _cons discret ,
_cons staples , _health care , financials , it and telecoms are sector classifiers (all 
sectors present excluding utilities). 
In order to study my second research question, I estimate the following equations:  
0 1 2 3 4 5_ _ _ _ _CAR dv Union dv Indiv dv Soc dv Unk dv Mix             
6 i i
i
recom control    
        (3) 
0 1 2 3 4 5_ _ _ _ _CAR n Union n Indiv n Soc n Unk n Mix             
6 i i
i
recom control    
        (4) 
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These equations allow me to explore the shareholder proposals, according to its origin, 
to assess whether there is a group of shareholders whose proposals influence financial 
markets. The dependent and control variables on equation 3 are computed as described 
above while _dv Union , _dv Indiv and _dv Soc correspond to the three basic categories 
of shareholders – coded 1 when the company receives a proposal from the matching 
shareholder group (and 0 otherwise) – joined by _dv Unk  and _dv Mix as proposals 
from unknown shareholders and those originated by more than one in that order. 
Similarly, equation 4 includes the number of proposals from the same groupings 
previously mentioned. 
In order to study my last research question, I estimate the following equations:  




          (5) 




          (6) 
These equations have the objective of analyzing proposals’ nature; this information is 
what investors are expected to consider the most as it is the motive behind the attempt 
to change the firm. The dependent and control variables on equation are again computed 
as described above whereas _dv PrCom , _dv PrCG and _dv PrSoc  code 1 if the 
proposal respectively regards compensation, corporate governance or social policy and 




Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the key and control variables, respectively, all 
to be used in the regression analyses. Firstly, an obvious comparison between the CARs 
in both dates of interest shows around the proxy statement date appears to be a positive 
reaction as both average and median edge above zero, contrary to the meeting date as 
these statistical indicators yield negative values. Companies with at least one proposal 
recommended to approve by the BoD represent 67.1% of the total sample; those with 
BoD proposals, though, already account for 65.7%. The average of number of proposals 
by shareholders and the BoD show companies receive an average of nearly 2.2 
shareholders proposals opposite to less than 0.7 Board proposals. In terms of 
shareholders, both institutional and individual groups target 43.6% of firms, while 
social groups yield 30.7%. Lastly, the majority of companies do not receive a single 
social policy proposal being out sailed by compensation and corporate governance.  
The initial research question pondered on whether financial markets made a distinction 
between proposals originated by the company’s BoD and by its shareholders; the results 
obtained on equations 1 and 2 corroborate what the research on the topic suggests. In 
fact, Table 5 shows the fact that a company is targeted by a shareholder is not, by itself, 
enough to affect its stock price, but if several proposals are submitted then it provokes a 
negative reaction on its equity. Forjan (1999) argues that firm value is reduced when 
there is a proposal in conflict with the management due to resource expenses; 
considering Boards repeated recommendations to reject shareholder proposals, one can 
infer that whenever a company is repeatedly targeted by shareholders on the proxy 
statement the management will attempt to avoid their approval, therefore trimming firm 
value down, implying a stock price movement in the same direction. Karpoff et al. 
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(1996) offer an alternative interpretation as shareholders first and foremost target poorly 
performing companies which may depict an off-putting allusion to investors. Board-
initiated proposals do not have an effect on stock price, consistent with the investors’ 
self-belief on the Board’s reliability view by Raghunandan (2003). Equation 1 presents 
an R
2 
of 6.6% which means the regressors explain this amount of the CAR behaviour in 
the selected time period while equation 2 yields a slightly higher value of 8.11%.  
Secondly, the shareholders effect was analyzed separately, by their type (Table 6). The 
institutional investors group is characterized as the most powerful, influential and in the 
best position to supervise the management, yet a single proposal submitted by one of 
these shareholders propels a negative reaction on the company’s stock price. When 
there is a large number of proposals, institutional investors are claimed the sole causers 
of a stock price decline. English et al. (2004) point out CalPERS’ activism as an 
example of influence effectiveness that translates into stock appreciation, and 
Holderness and Sheehan (1985) assert other investors possess similar influence. In light 
of these facts, an association between institutional investors and favourable market 
response could be suggested but results dash any hasty conjecture. In contrast, proposals 
shared by investors (mixed) achieve a remarkable role as investors seemingly reward 
the cooperative effort. One can deduce proposals have a positive effect on firm value if 
support from other shareholders is gathered to create them. Equation 3 registers an R
2
 of 
11.57% while equation 4 attains 12.91%. Although this implies a better explanation of 
the regressand than the previous regressions there are more regressors included. 
According to results of regressions 5 and 6, as found in Table 7, corporate governance 
proposals have, overall, an adverse outcome on a company’s equity, particularly when 
they are in large amount. Gillan and Starks (2007) mention active shareholders target 
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corporations with fragile governance structures, possibly alerting investors that then 
punish these companies. Bearing in mind that shareholders propose almost every 
corporate governance proposal and these have the highest approval rate at the annual 
meeting (and suspecting this to be fashion on previous years), one may assume the BoD 
considers this type of proposal as the most menacing. In this situation, markets may 
anticipate the Board’s resources consumption in an attempt to offset governance 
proposals and, if approved, firm value reduction to implement them. Disparately, the 
widely topic of executive compensation is rather overlooked due to its insignificance as 
regressors. Recalling the majority of compensation proposals derive from the BoDs it 
seems quite disappointing investors do not value the initiative of improving the 
compensation design. In fact, the managers’ effort to avoid a recurrence of the modest 
correlation between performance pay and success of the firms shown by Jensen and 
Murphy (1989) would, to some extent, attenuate the agency problem after an extremely 
severe financial crisis. Also, although the idea that social policy proposals provoke a 
negative reaction on investors due to its profit-harming nature, this does not materialize. 
Referring to their terrible approval rate, this outcome is perhaps not that shocking. 
Lastly, models 5 and 6 explain 11.07% and 12.32%, respectively, of the CAR. 
The intention to interpret these same equations referring to the annual meeting date was 
shattered as no key variables turn out to be significant. Most information is likely to be 
already incorporated on stock prices, particularly because of the Board’s 
recommendations to vote on proposals as a consistent prediction to the eventual voting 
outcome.  
For robustness purposes, I perform additional regressions based on research questions II 
and III: fixate a shareholder group, intersecting it with the three types of proposal (for 
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instance, _ * _dv Mix dv PrCom , _ * _dv Mix dv PrCG , _ * _dv Mix dv PrSoc ). In these 
untabulated results corporate governance proposals yield negative coefficients 
associated with institutional, individual and mixed groups while compensation 
proposals submitted by individuals positively affect a company’s stock price. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper offers a new understanding of the proxy statement proposals’ effect on the 
companies’ stock prices. The typically powerful institutional investors launched and 
established shareholder activism and, according to their precedents, have initiatives with 
beneficial end results. In this case, however, they are the only damaging shareholder 
crowd as a whole. In contrast, proposals jointly submitted by numerous shareholders 
manifestly cause a positive reaction on financial markets. Regarding compensation and 
social policy proposals, these are unnoticed by investors while corporate governance 
topics visibly taint firm value. The nature of proposals overshadows its initiator but 
compensation proposals by individuals improve the company’s stock performance. 
Finally, I propose possible next steps on researching this subject. A relevant analysis is 
to classify shareholders according to their share percentage, attempting to assess the 
importance of bargaining power on proposal recommendation and approval as well as 
financial markets’ response. Another idea would be to deeply investigate the 
compensation plans as to know how drastic changes are proposed. Then, rate the 
changes and test their separate effects on the market. For either studies, a precious 
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Figure 1 Sector weightings (by market cap, as of Dec 31, 2008) 
 
 






















Table 1 Companies breakdown 
 
 Sample Board of Directors Shareholders 
Energy 13 8 62% 11 85% 
Materials 6 3 50% 6 100% 
Industrials 25 12 48% 20 80% 
Consumer Discretionary 22 17 77% 16 73% 
Consumer Staples 22 12 55% 18 82% 
Health Care 13 9 69% 9 69% 
Financials 18 14 78% 13 72% 
IT 11 10 91% 8 73% 
Telecoms 4 4 100% 4 100% 
Utilities 6 4 67% 5 83% 
Total 140 93 66% 110 79% 
 
Table 2 Proposals by type of shareholder 
 
Shareholders 
Unions, pension funds and institutional investors 118 31% 
Individual investors 109 28% 
Social, environmental and religious groups 102 26% 
Unknown 56 15% 
Total 385  
 
Table 3 Proposals lifecycle 
 
Overall proposals 
 Total Recommended Approved 
Compensation 185 96 52% 111 60% 
Corporate governance 117 2 2% 34 29% 
Social policy 100 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 402 98  145  
Board proposals 
 Total Recommended Approved 
Compensation 95 95 100% 95 100% 
Corporate governance 1 1 100% 1 100% 
Social policy 0 0 - 0 - 
Total 96 96  96  
Shareholder proposals 
 Total Recommended Approved 
Compensation 90 1 1% 16 18% 
Corporate governance 116 1 1% 33 28% 
Social policy 100 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 306 2  49  
29 
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of key and control variables 
 
 
Average St. Deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
CAR (proxy) 0.009 0.004 0.003 -0.134 0.305 
CAR (meeting) -0.005 0.004 -0.005 -0.180 0.234 
recom 0.671 0.040 1 0 1 
dv_BoD 0.664 0.040 1 0 1 
dv_Sh 0.786 0.035 1 0 1 
n_BoD 0.686 0.043 1 0 2 
n_Sh 2.186 0.171 2 0 11 
dv_Union 0.436 0.042 0 0 1 
dv_Indiv 0.436 0.042 0 0 1 
dv_Soc 0.307 0.039 0 0 1 
dv_Unk 0.129 0.028 0 0 1 
dv_Mix 0.193 0.033 0 0 1 
n_Union 0.850 0.110 0 0 6 
n_Indiv 0.779 0.099 0 0 6 
n_Soc 0.714 0.135 0 0 9 
n_Unk 0.400 0.106 0 0 7 
n_Mix 0.557 0.130 0 0 10 
dv_PrCom 0.893 0.026 1 0 1 
dv_PrCG 0.514 0.042 1 0 1 
dv_PrSoc 0.436 0.042 0 0 1 
n_PrCom 1.321 0.067 1 0 3 
n_PrCG 0.836 0.085 1 0 4 
n_PrSoc 0.714 0.090 0 0 6 
size 19.735 0.102 19.547 17.572 23.803 
dv_NI 0.786 0.035 1 0 1 
epss -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.216 0.177 
energy 0.093 0.025 0 0 1 
materials 0.043 0.017 0 0 1 
industrials 0.179 0.032 0 0 1 
cons. disc.  0.157 0.031 0 0 1 
cons. stap. 0.157 0.031 0 0 1 
health care 0.093 0.025 0 0 1 
financials 0.129 0.028 0 0 1 
it 0.079 0.023 0 0 1 











Table 5 Analysis of first research question 
 
 Equation 1 Equation 2 
 
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
dv_BoD 0.023 0.66 - - 
dv_Sh -0.010 0.41 - - 
n_BoD - - -0.008 0.76 
n_Sh - - -0.005 0.09 
β0 0.058 0.58 -0.018 0.88 
recom -0.024 0.65 0.004 0.88 
size -0.002 0.74 0.002 0.72 
dv_NI 0.010 0.41 0.011 0.38 
epss 0.206 0.45 0.285 0.30 
energy -0.015 0.56 -0.010 0.71 
materials -0.016 0.60 -0.015 0.61 
industrials -0.010 0.67 -0.006 0.80 
cons_ disc  -0.004 0.88 0.001 0.97 
cons_stap -0.017 0.48 -0.014 0.57 
health_care -0.042 0.10 -0.040 0.11 
financials -0.024 0.38 -0.027 0.32 
it -0.019 0.48 -0.015 0.56 









Table 6 Analysis of second research question 
 
 Equation 3 Equation 4 
  Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
dv_Union -0.023 0.03 - - 
dv_Indiv 0.008 0.46 - - 
dv_Soc -0.015 0.17 - - 
dv_Unk -0.025 0.12 - - 
dv_Mix 0.012 0.39 - - 
n_Union - - -0.012 0.01 
n_Indiv - - 0.002 0.70 
n_Soc - - -0.007 0.13 
n_Unk - - -0.005 0.28 
n_Mix - - 0.013 0.02 
β0 0.007 0.95 -0.020 0.86 
recom 0.000 0.99 -0.001 0.95 
size 0.001 0.88 0.002 0.71 
dv_NI 0.010 0.40 0.009 0.47 
epss 0.101 0.72 0.059 0.84 
energy -0.014 0.60 -0.008 0.77 
materials -0.009 0.77 -0.012 0.69 
industrials -0.002 0.94 -0.007 0.77 
cons_ disc  0.005 0.84 0.001 0.96 
cons_stap -0.010 0.66 -0.013 0.58 
health_care -0.034 0.19 -0.036 0.16 
financials -0.028 0.31 -0.029 0.28 
it -0.018 0.50 -0.014 0.59 









Table 7 Analysis of third research question 
 
 Equation 5 Equation 6 
  Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
dv_PrCom 0.013 0.47 - - 
dv_PrCG -0.023 0.02 - - 
dv_PrSoc 0.000 0.98 - - 
n_PrCom - - -0.004 0.61 
n_PrCG - - -0.016 0.00 
n_PrSoc - - 0.001 0.83 
β0 0.060 0.56 -0.028 0.81 
recom -0.009 0.46 -0.004 0.70 
size -0.002 0.74 0.003 0.58 
dv_NI 0.009 0.43 0.008 0.48 
epss 0.229 0.39 0.439 0.11 
energy -0.015 0.55 -0.017 0.51 
materials -0.018 0.55 -0.020 0.49 
industrials -0.015 0.52 -0.012 0.62 
cons_ disc  -0.005 0.83 -0.004 0.87 
cons_stap -0.022 0.36 -0.022 0.36 
health_care -0.047 0.07 -0.043 0.09 
financials -0.020 0.44 -0.031 0.25 
it -0.025 0.34 -0.026 0.32 
telecoms 0.011 0.75 0.018 0.60 
R
2 
11.07% 12.32% 
 
